

# Kubernetes (IN)Security

# About Me

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Corporate & Startup world

Obsessive ❤️ cybersecurity



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


# — Agenda


- Introduction to Containers
- Introduction to Kubernetes
- Most common attack techniques in K8S
- K8s build-in defenses
- Bonus: Kubernetes local CTF challenge

# Application compartmentalization


Traditional Architecture



VM Architecture




Container Architecture



# So, what containers really are?

- Namespaces
- Cgroups
- Capabilities






**THERE IS NO CONTAINER**


**IS JUST ANOTHER PROCESS  
RUNNING ON YOUR MACHINE**

# What is kubernetes anyways?



# Kubernetes primitives

- Service
- Deployment
- Pod
- StatefulSet
- Configmap
- Secret
- ...
- ..
- Many more





# Kubernetes Components


# Kubernetes components

## Control Plane Components

- kube-apiserver
- etcd
- kube-scheduler
- kube-controller

## Node Components

- kube-proxy
- kubelet
- container runtime



# Kubernetes most common attack techniques

# Threat matrix for Kubernetes


<https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/04/02/attack-matrix-kubernetes/>

Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Impact
Using Cloud credentials	Exec into container	Backdoor container	Privileged container	Clear container logs	List K8S secrets	Access the K8S API server	Access cloud resources	Data Destruction
Compromised images in registry	bash/cmd inside container	Writable hostPath mount	Cluster-admin binding	Delete K8S events	Mount service principal	Access Kubelet API	Container service account	Resource Hijacking
Kubeconfig file	New container	Kubernetes CronJob	hostPath mount	Pod / container name similarity	Access container service account	Network mapping	Cluster internal networking	Denial of service
Application vulnerability	Application exploit (RCE)		Access cloud resources	Connect from Proxy server	Applications credentials in configuration files	Access Kubernetes dashboard	Applications credentials in configuration files	
Exposed Dashboard	SSH server running inside container					Instance Metadata API	Writable volume mounts on the host	
							Access Kubernetes dashboard	
							Access tiller endpoint	

# Updated threat matrix for Kubernetes

<https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/23/secure-containerized-environments-with-updated-threat-matrix-for-kubernetes/>

Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Impact
Using Cloud credentials	Exec into container	Backdoor container	Privileged container	Clear container logs	List K8S secrets	Access the K8S API server	Access cloud resources	Images from a private registry	Data Destruction
Compromised images in registry	bash/cmd inside container	Writable hostPath mount	Cluster-admin binding	Delete K8S events	Mount service principal	Access Kubelet API	Container service account		Resource Hijacking
Kubeconfig file	New container	Kubernetes CronJob	hostPath mount	Pod / container name similarity	Access container service account	Network mapping	Cluster internal networking		Denial of service
Application vulnerability	Application exploit (RCE)	Malicious admission controller	Access cloud resources	Connect from Proxy server	Applications credentials in configuration files	Access Kubernetes dashboard	Applications credentials in configuration files		
Exposed Dashboard	SSH server running inside container				Access managed identity credential	Instance Metadata API	Writable volume mounts on the host		
Exposed sensitive interfaces	Sidcar injection				Malicious admission controller		Access Kubernetes dashboard		
							Access tiller endpoint		
							CoreDNS poisoning		
							ARP poisoning and IP spoofing		

 = New technique

 = Deprecated technique

# Initial Access

- Using cloud credentials
- Compromised images and registry
- Kubeconfig file
- Application Vulnerability
- Exposed sensitive interfaces



Amazon EKS



docker hub



# Using cloud credentials




Google Cloud



# Compromised registry and images

- Supply Chain Attacks
- Vulnerable dependencies on images












# Application vulnerabilities


- OWASP Top 10
- SQLi
- RCE
- Command injection
- Etc

# Exposed sensitive interfaces




# Execution - Running code inside the cluster


- Application exploit (RCE)
- SSH server running inside container
- Exec into container
- New container
- Sidecar Injection




# Execution - Exec into the container



# Execution - Deploying new containers




# Execution - Sidecar Injection





# Persistence

- Backdoor container
- Kubernetes CronJob
- Writable hostPath mount
- Malicious admission controller






# Persistence - Writable hostPath mount



# Persistence - Malicious admission controller



# Privilege Escalation

- HostPath mount
- Access cloud resources
- Privileged container
- Cluster-admin binding

K8S Cluster takeover



App exposed to the  
Internet

# Privilege Escalation - Privileged container



**Duffie Cooley**




@maulion




```
kubectl run r00t --restart=Never -ti --rm --image lol --  
overrides '{"spec":{"hostPID": true, "containers":  
[{"name":"1","image":"alpine","command":["nsenter","-  
-mount=/proc/1/ns/mnt","--","/bin/bash"],"stdin":  
true,"tty":true,"securityContext":{"privileged":true}}]}'
```

12:27 PM · May 17, 2019 · Twitter Web Client

# Privileged container - A container that doesn't contain anything



# Privilege Escalation - Cluster-admin binding



# Defense Evasion

- Clear container logs
- Delete Kubernetes events
- Pod / Container name similarity
- Connect from Proxy server

NAMESPACE↑	NAME
kube-system	coredns-74ff55c5b-9z
kube-system	coredns-74ff55c5b-pt
kube-system	etcd-aerith-cluster-
kube-system	kindnet-4r6v7
kube-system	kindnet-9x9bm
kube-system	kindnet-b7h82

# Credential Access

- List Kubernetes secrets

- Mount Service Principal



- Access container service account

`/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token`

- Applications credentials in configuration files

- Access managed identity credential



Amazon EKS

- Malicious admission controller




# Discovery

- Access the Kubernetes API server
- Access Kubelet API
- Network mapping
- Access Kubernetes dashboard
- Instance Metadata API

# Lateral Movement

- Access cloud resources
- Container service account
- Cluster internal networking
- Applications credentials in configuration files
- Writable volume mounts on the host
- CoreDNS poisoning



# Collection

- Images from private registry



```
1  apiVersion: v1
2  kind: Secret
3  metadata:
4    ...
5    name: regcred
6    ...
7  data:
8    .dockerconfigjson: eyJodHRwczovL2luZGV4L ... J0QUl6RTIifX0=
9  type: kubernetes.io/dockerconfigjson
10 ---
11 apiVersion: v1
12 kind: Pod
13 metadata:
14   name: private-reg
15 spec:
16   containers:
17   - name: private-reg-container
18     image: <your-private-image>
19     imagePullSecrets:
20     - name: regcred
```

# Impact

- Data destruction
- Resource Hijacking
- Denial of service



# Kubernetes build-in defences

# Security Context for Pods

# Set the security context for a Pod

- allowPrivilegeEscalation
- capabilities
- privileged
- runAsGroup
- runAsNonRoot
- runAsUser
- seLinuxOptions
- seccompProfile
- etc

```
1  apiVersion: v1
2  kind: Pod
3  metadata:
4    name: security-context-demo
5  spec:
6    securityContext:
7      runAsUser: 1000
8      runAsGroup: 3000
9      fsGroup: 2000
10   volumes:
11     - name: sec-ctx-vol
12       emptyDir: {}
13   containers:
14     - name: sec-ctx-demo
15       image: busybox
16       command: [ "sh", "-c", "sleep 1h" ]
17       volumeMounts:
18         - name: sec-ctx-vol
19           mountPath: /data/demo
20       securityContext:
21         allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
```

# Network Policies




# Network Policies



# Network Policies

```
1 apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
2 kind: NetworkPolicy
3 metadata:
4   name: test-network-policy
5   namespace: default
6 spec:
7   podSelector:
8     matchLabels:
9       role: db
10  policyTypes:
11  - Ingress
12  - Egress
13  ingress:
14  - from:
15    - ipBlock:
16      cidr: 172.17.0.0/16
17      except:
18        - 172.17.1.0/24
19    - namespaceSelector:
20      matchLabels:
21        project: myproject
22    - podSelector:
23      matchLabels:
24        role: frontend
25  ports:
26  - protocol: TCP
27    port: 6379
28  egress:
29  - to:
30    - ipBlock:
31      cidr: 10.0.0.0/24
32    ports:
33    - protocol: TCP
34      port: 5978
```



# Pod Security Policies

# Pod Security Policies + RBAC

- PodSecurityPolicy
- ClusterRole
- ClusterRoleBinding
- Role
- RoleBinding

# Protect cluster against malicious pods

## PodSecurityPolicy

```
1 apiVersion: policy/v1beta1
2 kind: PodSecurityPolicy
3 metadata:
4   name: restrictive ←
5 spec:
6   privileged: false
7   hostNetwork: false
8   allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
9   defaultAllowPrivilegeEscalation: false
10  hostPID: false
11  hostIPC: false
12  runAsUser:
13    rule: RunAsAny
14  fsGroup:
15    rule: RunAsAny
16  selinux:
17    rule: RunAsAny
18  supplementalGroups:
19    rule: RunAsAny
20  volumes:
21  - 'configMap'
22  - 'downwardAPI'
23  - 'emptyDir'
24  - 'persistentVolumeClaim'
25  - 'secret'
26  - 'projected'
```


## ClusterRole

```
1 kind: ClusterRole
2 apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
3 metadata:
4   name: psp-restrictive
5 rules:
6 - apiGroups:
7   - extensions
8   resources:
9   - podsecuritypolicies
10  resourceName: ←
11  - restrictive
12  verbs:
13  - use
```

## ClusterRoleBinding

```
1 kind: ClusterRoleBinding
2 apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
3 metadata:
4   name: psp-default
5 subjects:
6 - kind: Group ←
7   name: system:serviceaccounts
8   namespace: kube-system
9 roleRef:
10  kind: ClusterRole ←
11  name: psp-restrictive
12  apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io
```

# Protect cluster against malicious pods



# Protect cluster against malicious pods

```
2 kind: Deployment
3 metadata:
4   name: nginx-hostnetwork-deployment
5   namespace: default
6   labels:
7     app: nginx
8 spec:
9   replicas: 1
10  selector:
11    matchLabels:
12      app: nginx
13  template:
14    metadata:
15      labels:
16        app: nginx
17    spec:
18      containers:
19        - name: nginx
20          image: nginx:1.15.4
21          hostNetwork: true
```


```
Controlled By: Deployment/nginx-hostnetwork-deployment
Replicas:      0 current / 1 desired
Pods Status:   0 Running / 0 Waiting / 0 Succeeded / 0 Failed
Pod Template:
  Labels: app=nginx
           pod-template-hash=597c4cff45
```

```
Containers:
  nginx:
    Image:      nginx:1.15.4
    Port:       <none>
    Host Port:  <none>
    Environment: <none>
    Mounts:     <none>
    Volumes:    <none>
Conditions:
  Type           Status  Reason
  ----           -
  ReplicaFailure True    FailedCreate
```

```
Events:
  Type    Reason      Age    From    Message
```

```
Warning FailedCreate 13s (x13 over 33s) replicaset-controller Error creating pods "nginx-hostnetwork-deployment-597c4cff45-" is forbidden: unable to validate against any pod security policy: [spec.securityContext.hostNetwork: Invalid value: true: Host network is not allowed to be used]
```

# Policy for pods in kube-system namespace with RoleBinding





# Open Policy Agent

# Open Policy Agent

- OPA Gatekeeper: Policy and Governance for Kubernetes
- <https://www.openpolicyagent.org/>
- Admission controller
- Validation
- Mutation (to be implemented)



# Audit Log

# Audit Log

- What happened?
- When did it happened?
- Who initiated it?
- On what did it happen?
- Where was it observed?
- From where was it initiated?
- ...



 Falco



Logstash

# Summary

- Don't deploy images from untrusted sources in your cluster
- Try not to store sensitive data on K8S secrets, instead use something like kube-seal or and **external KMS** to manage secrets
- Choose **CNI plugin** that supports **network policies** and limit communication between your **pod/services**
- Never use **cluster-admin** the **ClusterRole** sa in your applications
- ~~Define strong **Pod Security Policies** for each of your services, **principle of least privilege**~~ Use OPA to enforce policies in your cluster
- Enable Audit Log for you cluster

# Bonus: Kubernetes local CTF Challenge

# Bonus: Kubernetes local CTF Challenge

## Requirements

- <https://docs.docker.com/get-docker/> (docker)
- <https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/tools/> (kubectl)
- <https://kind.sigs.k8s.io/> (kind)
- <https://kustomize.io/> (kustomize)

# Bonus: Kubernetes local CTF Challenge

## Create local Kubernetes cluster

- `kind create cluster`

## Deploy the challenge

- `git clone https://github.com/Alevsk/dvka.git`
- `cd ./dvka/lab-1`
- `kustomize build k8s/base | kubectl apply -f -`
- `kubectl port-forward svc/nft-store 8080:8080 -n lab-1`





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# Resources used during this presentation

- <https://www.redhat.com/en/blog/openshift-and-kubernetes-whats-difference>
- <https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/23/secure-containerized-environments-with-updated-threat-matrix-for-kubernetes/>
- <https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/04/02/attack-matrix-kubernetes/>
- <https://blog.aquasec.com/kubernetes-security-pod-escape-log-mounts>
- <https://www.parsons.com/2020/08/kubernetes-security-embracing-built-in-primitives-for-more-secure-environments/>
- <https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/configure-pod-container/security-context/>

# Thanks

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